La Demanderesse souhaitait abandonner le recours et déposer une demande divisionnaire. Son mandataire avait alors retiré le recours, mais avant de déposer la demande divisionnaire. Il avait ensuite requis l'annulation de sa déclaration de retrait par le biais d'une correction d'erreur selon la règle 139 CBE.
La Chambre rappelle deux principes.
Tout d'abord les erreurs au sens de la règle 139 CBE sont des erreurs d'expression ou de transcription dans une déclaration, erreurs qui ne se produisent donc qu'au moment où la déclaration est faite. Les erreurs commises dans la phase préparatoire à cette déclaration, telles que des erreurs relatives à la motivation générale, au processus décisionnel ou aux hypothèses sur lesquelles la déclaration est fondée, ne sont pas pertinentes.
Ensuite, l'erreur doit avoir été commise par la personne qui était compétente pour prendre la décision procédurale devant l'OEB, ici le mandataire agréé. Il ne suffit donc pas qu'il y ait une divergence entre l'intention véritable de la partie et la déclaration soumise par le mandataire, il faut qu'il y ait erreur dans l'expression même des intentions propres de ce mandataire. La correction d'erreur ne doit pas permettre à une personne de donner effet à un changement d'avis ou de stratégie. C'est donc l'intention véritable de la personne qui soumet la déclaration qui est décisive.
Dans le cas d'espèce, en signant et en envoyant la déclaration, le mandataire n'a pas commis d'erreur quant à la déclaration, son contenu ou sa transmission.
L'erreur, qui a consisté à ne plus avoir en tête les instructions du client au moment de soumettre la déclaration de retrait, a été commise dans la phase préparatoire, et n'est donc pas une erreur au sens de la règle 139 CBE.
La Chambre laisse ouverte la question de la possibilité même d'appliquer la règle 139 CBE au retrait d'un recours (cf affaire T695/18, où la Chambre a répondu par la négative dans son avis provisoire du fait qu'il n'y avait plus d'affaire en instance suite à un retrait).
2 comments:
This decision illustrates a couple of points. The decision is based on an immaculate and complex reasoning of the Board, who cannot be criticized for making their detailed and literal analysis of the many case law principles the Board quotes. But the decision is based on the assumption that the sought-for correction was contrary to legal certainty. This seems to be simply an assumption, without any justification. In my opinion, it was clearly a wrong assumption, because legal certainty has been interpreted in a Humpty Dumpty way. Also, the Boards operate under the protection of the EPOs immunity from the consequences of any mistakes they may make.. The EPOs immunity has been an important factor in stabilizing the EPOs existence in its start-up years and this immunity should not be put into question. However, the decision illustrates that a professional representative who made a mistake in a legitimate attempt to obtain patent exclusivity by filing a divisional was denied any possibility of correction and could even be liable for the consequences of the error. This is unfair to professional representatives and the applicants they represent. In my upcoming book, I’ll put forward my point of view that, with the UP/UPC coming into force, there is an urgent need to review the way the EPC is interpreted in the light of the purpose and spirit of the EPC, where the granting of patent exclusivity should take precedence over procedural issues. Also, the way legal certainty has been assumed needs to be reviewed.
Dear Brian,
I allow myself to draw your attention to J 3/22 published on 03.02.2023, i.e. shortly after T 2474/19 published on 23.01.2023.
The catchword of J 3/22 says the following:
"Once the public is officially informed by an EPO publication of an explicit declaration of withdrawal and without any indication that this declaration might have been erroneous, there is no room for a further balancing of the interests of the general public and the applicant (confirming the settled case law of the boards of appeal, see Reasons 2.2 to 2.13)".
More precisely, once the letter of withdrawal has been entered in the register, the public has been informed, and it is no possible to "withdraw the withdrawal".
I have not compared in detail the case law in both decisions. It seems however that the case law quoted in J 3/22 seems even more pungent than that in T 2474/19.
Just look at points 2.4 and 2.5 of J 3/22:
“2.4 Since decision J 10/87, requests for retraction of the withdrawal of an application as a whole have only been held allowable under Rule 88 EPC 1973 and later under Rule 139 EPC 2007 if the public had not been officially notified of the withdrawal by the EPO at the time the retraction of the withdrawal was applied for.
2.5 Since decision J 25/03 (referring to decisions T 824/00 and J 14/04), it is established case law that an entry in the Register of European Patents renders a declaration of withdrawal public in the same way as a publication in the Patent Bulletin.”
Hence, it seems not correct to claim that "legal certainty has been interpreted in a Humpty Dumpty way". Furthermore, legal certainty has nothing to do with the immunity of the EPO.
There is thus nothing unfair to professional representatives and the applicants they represent by adopting this position. It is established case law.
If I am not wrong, this is one of the reasons why representatives have a liability insurance to cover for the consequences of such unintentional mistakes.
https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/j220003eu1.html
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